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Abstract
We consider how an agent should update her uncertainty when it is represented by a
set P of probability distributions and the agent observes that a random variable X takes on
value x, given that the agent makes decisions using the minimax criterion, perhaps the best-
studied and most commonly-used criterion in the literature. We adopt a game-theoretic
framework, where the agent plays against a bookie, who chooses some distribution from
P. We consider two reasonable games that differ in what the bookie knows when he
makes his choice. Anomalies that have been observed before, like time inconsistency, can
be understood as arising because different games are being played, against bookies with
different information. We characterize the important special cases in which the optimal
decision rules according to the minimax criterion amount to either conditioning or simply
ignoring the information. Finally, we consider the relationship between conditioning and
calibration when uncertainty is described by sets of probabilities.
1 Introduction
Suppose that an agent models her uncertainty about a domain using a set P of probability distri-
butions. How should the agent make decisions? Perhaps the best-studied and most commonly-
used approach in the literature is to use the minimax criterion [Wald 1950; Ga¨rdenfors and Sahlin 1982;
Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989]. According to the minimax criterion, action a1 is preferred to ac-
tion a2 if the worst-case expected loss of a1 (with respect to all the probability distributions in
the setP under consideration) is better than the worst-case expected loss of a2. Thus, the action
chosen is the one with the best worst-case outcome.
We are often interested in making decisions, not just in a static situation, but in a more
dynamic situation, where the agent may make some observations, or learn some informa-
tion. This leads to an obvious question: If the agent represents her uncertainty using a set
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P of probability distributions, how should she update P in light of observing that random
variable X takes on value x? Perhaps the standard answer is to condition each distribution
in P on X = x (more precisely, to condition those distributions in P that give X = x
positive probability on X = x), and adopt the resulting set of conditional distributions P |
X = x as her representation of uncertainty. As has been pointed out by several authors, this
sometimes leads to a phenomenon called dilation [Augustin 2003; Cozman and Walley 2001;
Herron, Seidenfeld, and Wasserman 1997; Seidenfeld and Wasserman 1993]: the agent may
have substantial knowledge about some other random variable Y before observing X = x,
but know significantly less after conditioning. Walley [1991, p. 299] gives a simple example
of dilation: suppose that a fair coin is tossed twice, where the second toss may depend in an
arbitrary way on the first. (In particular, the tosses might be guaranteed to be identical, or
guaranteed to be different.) If X represents the outcome of the first toss and Y represents the
outcome of the second toss, then before observing X , the agent believes that the probability
that Y is heads is 1/2, while after observing X , the agent believes that the probability that Y
is heads can be an arbitrary element of [0, 1].
While, as this example and others provided by Walley show, such dilation can be quite
reasonable, it interacts rather badly with the minimax criterion, leading to anomalous behavior
that has been called time inconsistency [Gru¨nwald and Halpern 2004; Seidenfeld 2004]: the
minimax-optimal conditional decision rule before the value of X is observed (which has the
form “If X = 0 then do a1; if X = 1 then do a2; . . . ”) may be different from the minimax
decision rule obtained after conditioning. For example, the minimax-optimal conditional deci-
sion rule may say “If X = 0 then do a1”, but the minimax-optimal decision rule conditional
on observing X = 0 may be a2. (See Example 2.1.) If uncertainty is modeled using a single
distribution, such time inconsistency cannot arise.
To understand this phenomenon better, we model the decision problem as a game between
the agent and a bookie. It turns out that there is more than one possible game that can be
considered, depending on what information the bookie has. We focus on two (closely related)
games here. In the first game, the bookie chooses a distribution from P before the agent moves.
We show that the Nash equilibrium of this game leads to a minimax decision rule. (Indeed,
this can be viewed as a justification of using the minimax criterion). However, in this game,
conditioning on the information is not always optimal.1
In the second game, the bookie gets to choose the distribution after the value of X is
observed. Again, in this game, the Nash equilibrium leads to the use of minimax, but now
conditioning is the right thing to do.
If P is a singleton, the two games coincide (since there is only one choice the bookie can
make, and the agent knows what it is). Not surprisingly, conditioning is the appropriate thing
to do in this case. The moral of this analysis is that, when uncertainty is characterized by a
set of distributions, if the agent is making decision using the minimax criterion, then the right
decision depends on the game being played. The agent must consider if she is trying to protect
1In some other senses of the words “conditioning” and “optimal,” conditioning on the information is always
optimal. This is discussed further in Section 6.
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herself against an adversary who knows the value of X = x when choosing the distribution or
one that does not know the value of X = x.
In earlier work [Gru¨nwald and Halpern 2004] (GH from now on), we essentially considered
the first game, and showed that, in this game, conditioning was not always the right thing to do
when using the minimax criterion. Indeed, we showed there are sets P and games for which
the minimax-optimal decision rule is to simply ignore the information. Our analysis of the
first game lets us go beyond GH here in two ways. First, we characterize exactly when it is
minimax optimal to ignore information. Second, we provide a simple sufficient condition for
when conditioning on the information is minimax optimal.
Ignoring the information can be viewed as the result of conditioning; not conditioning
on the information, but conditioning on the whole space. This leads to a natural question:
suppose that when we observe x, we condition on the event that X ∈ C(x), where C(x) is
some set containing x, but not necessarily equal to {x}. Is this variant of conditioning, an
approach we call C-conditioning, always minimax optimal in the first game? That is, is it
always optimal to condition on something? As we show by considering the well-known Monty
Hall Problem (Example 5.3), this is not the case in general. Nevertheless, C-conditioning has
some interesting properties: it is closely related to the concept of calibration [Dawid 1982].
Calibration is usually defined in terms of empirical data. To explain what it means, consider
an agent that is a weather forecaster on your local television station. Every night the forecaster
makes a prediction about whether or not it will rain the next day in the area where you live.
She does this by asserting that the probability of rain is p, where p ∈ {0, 0.1, . . . , 0.9, 1}. How
should we interpret these probabilities? The usual interpretation is that, in the long run, on
those days at which the weather forecaster predict probability p, it will rain approximately
100p% of the time [Dawid 1982]. Thus, for example, among all days for which she predicted
0.1, the fraction of days with rain was close to 0.1. A weather forecaster with this property is
called calibrated.
Up to now, calibration has been considered only when uncertainty is characterized by a
single distribution. We generalize the notion of calibration to our setting, where uncertainty
is characterized by a set of distributions. We then show that a rule for updating a set of prob-
abilities is guaranteed to be calibrated if and only if it is an instance of C-conditioning. In
combination with our earlier results, this implies that if calibration is considered essential, then
an update rule may sometimes result in decisions that are not minimax optimal.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the basic framework.
In Section 3, we formally define the two games described above and show that the minimax-
optimal decision rule gives a Nash equilibrium. In Section 4, we characterize the minimax-
optimal decision rule for the first game, in which the bookie chooses a distribution before X is
observed. In Section 5, we discuss C-conditioning and calibration.
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2 Notation and Definitions
Preliminaries: For ease of exposition, we assume throughout this paper that we are inter-
ested in two random variables,X and Y , which can take values in spacesX and Y , respectively.
P always denotes a set of distributions on X × Y ; that is, P ⊆ ∆(X × Y), where, as usual,
∆(S) denotes the set of probability distributions on S. For ease of exposition, we assume that
P is a closed set; this is a standard assumption in the literature that seems quite natural in our
applications, and makes the statement of our results simpler. If Pr ∈ ∆(X × Y), let PrX and
PrY denote the marginals of Pr on X and Y , respectively. Let PY = {PrY : Pr ∈ P}. If
E ⊆ X × Y , then let P | E = {Pr | E : Pr ∈ P,Pr(E) > 0}. Here Pr | E (denoted by some
authors as Pr(· | E)) is the distribution on X × Y obtained by conditioning on E.
Loss Functions: As in GH, we are interested in an agent who must choose some action from
a set A, where the loss of the action depends only on the value of random variable Y . For ease
of exposition, we assume in this paper that X , Y , and A are always finite. We assume that with
each action a ∈ A and value y ∈ Y is associated some loss to the agent. (The losses can be
negative, which amounts to a gain.) Let L : Y ×A → IR be the loss function.2
Such loss functions arise quite naturally. For example, in a medical setting, we can take Y
to consist of the possible diseases andX to consist of symptoms. The setA consists of possible
courses of treatment that a doctor can choose. The doctor’s loss function depends only on the
patient’s disease and the course of treatment, not on the symptoms. But, in general, the doctor’s
choice of treatment depends on the symptoms observed.
Decision Rules: Suppose that the agent observes the value of a variable X that takes on val-
ues in X . After having observed X , she must perform an act, the quality of which is judged
according to loss function L. The agent must choose a decision rule that determines what she
does as a function of her observations. We allow decision rules to be randomized. Thus, a
decision rule is a function δ : X → ∆(A) that chooses a distribution over actions based on
the agent’s observations. Let D(X ,A) be the set of all decision rules. A special case is a
deterministic decision rule, which assigns probability 1 to a particular action. If δ is determin-
istic, we sometimes abuse notation and write δ(x) for the action that is assigned probability
1 by the distribution δ(x). Given a decision rule δ and a loss function L, let Lδ be the ran-
dom variable on X × Y such that Lδ(x, y) =
∑
a∈A δ(x)(a)L(y, a). Here δ(x)(a) stands for
the probability of performing action a according to the distribution δ(x) over actions that is
adopted when x is observed. Note that in the special case that δ is a deterministic decision rule,
Lδ(x, y) = L(y, δ(x)).
A decision rule δ0 is a priori minimax optimal with respect to P and A if
maxPr∈PEPr[Lδ0 ] = minδ∈D(X ,A)maxPr∈PEPr[Lδ]. (1)
2We could equally well use utilities, which can be viewed as a positive measure of gain. Losses seem to be
somewhat more standard in this literature.
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That is, δ0 is a priori minimax optimal if δ0 gives the best worst-case expected loss with respect
to all the distributions in Pr. Note that we can write max here instead of sup because of our
assumption that P is closed. This ensures that there is some Pr ∈ P for which EPr[Lδ0 ] takes
on its maximum value.
A decision rule δ1 is a posteriori minimax optimal with respect to P and A if, for all x ∈ X
such that Pr(X = x) > 0 for some Pr ∈ P ,
maxPr∈P|X=xEPr[Lδ1 ] =
minδ∈D(X ,A)maxPr∈P|X=xEPr[Lδ].
(2)
To get the a posteriori minimax-optimal decision rule we do the obvious thing: if x is observed,
we simply condition each probability distribution Pr ∈ P on X = x, and choose the action
that gives the least expected loss (in the worst case) with respect to P | X = x.Note that
all distributions Pr mentioned in (2) satisfy Pr(X = x) = 1. Therefore, the minimum over
δ ∈ D(X ,A) does not depend on the values of δ(x′) for x′ 6= x; the minimum is effectively
over randomized actions rather than decision rules.
As the following example, taken from GH, shows, a priori minimax-optimal decision rules
are in general different from a posteriori minimax-optimal decision rules.
Example 2.1: Suppose that X = Y = A = {0, 1} and P = {Pr ∈ ∆(X × Y) : PrY(Y =
1) = 2/3}. Thus, P consists of all distributions whose marginal on Y gives Y = 1 probability
2/3. We can think of the actions in A as predictions of the value of Y . The loss function is 0 if
the right value is predicted and 1 otherwise; that is, L(i, j) = |i− j|. This is the so-called 0/1
or classification loss. It is easy to see that the optimal a priori decision rule is to choose 1 no
matter what is observed (which has expected loss 1/3). Intuitively, observing the value of X
tells us nothing about the value of Y , so the best decision is the one which predicts according
to the prior probability of Y = 1. However, all probabilities on Y = 1 are compatible with
observing either X = 0 or X = 1. That is, both (P | X = 0)Y and (P | X = 1)Y consist of
all distributions on Y . Thus, the minimax optimal a posteriori decision rule randomizes (with
equal probability) between Y = 0 and Y = 1.
Thus, if you make decisions according to the minimax rule, then before making an obser-
vation, you will predict Y = 1. However, no matter what observation you make, after making
the observation, you will randomize (with equal probability) between predicting Y = 0 and
Y = 1. Moreover, you know even before making the observation that your opinion as to the
best decision rule will change in this way.
3 Two Game-Theoretic Interpretations of P
What does it mean that an agent’s uncertainty is characterized by a setP of probability distribu-
tions? How should we understand P? We give P a game-theoretic interpretation here: namely,
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an adversary gets to choose a distribution from the set P .3 But this does not completely specify
the game. We must also specify when the adversary makes the choice. We consider two times
that the adversary can choose: the first is before the agents observes the value of X , and the
second is after. We formalize this as two different games, where we take the “adversary” to be
a bookie.
We call the first game the P-game. It is defined as follows:
1. The bookie chooses a distribution Pr ∈ P .
2. The value x of X is chosen (by nature) according to PrX and observed by both bookie
and agent.
3. The agent chooses an action a ∈ A.
4. The value y of Y is chosen according to Pr | X = x.
5. The agent’s loss is L(y, a); the bookie’s loss is −L(y, a).
This is a zero-sum game; the agent’s loss is the bookie’s gain. In this game, the agent’s strategy
is a decision rule, that is, a function that gives a distribution over actions for each observed
value of X . The bookie’s strategy is a distribution over distributions in P .
We now consider a second interpretation of P , characterized by a different game that gives
the bookie more power. Rather than choosing the distribution before observing the value of X ,
the bookie gets to choose the distribution after observing the value. We call this theP-X-game.
1. The value x of X is chosen (by nature) in such a way that Pr(X = x) > 0 for some
Pr ∈ P , and observed by both the bookie and the agent.
2. The bookie chooses a distribution Pr ∈ P such that Pr(X = x) > 0.4
3. The agent chooses an action a ∈ A.
4. The value y of Y is chosen according to Pr | X = x.
5. The agent’s loss is L(y, a); the bookie’s loss is −L(y, a).
Recall that a pair of strategies (S1, S2) is a Nash equilibrium if neither party can do better
by unilaterally changing strategies. If, as in our case, (S1, S2) is a Nash equilibrium in a zero-
sum game, it is also known as a “saddle point”; S1 must be a minimax strategy, and S2 must be
a maximin strategy [Gru¨nwald and Dawid 2004]. As the following results show, an agent must
be using an a priori minimax-optimal decision rule in a Nash equilibrium of the P-game, and
3This interpretation remains meaningful in several practical situations where there is no explicit adversary; see
the final paragraph of this section.
4If we were to consider conditional probability measures, for which Pr(Y = y | X = x) is defined even if
Pr(X = x) = 0, then we could drop the restriction that x is chosen such that Pr(X = x) > 0 for some Pr ∈ P .
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an a posteriori minimax-optimal decision rule is a Nash equilibrium of the P-X-game. This
can be viewed as a justification for using (a priori and a posteriori) minimax-optimal decision
rules.
Theorem 3.1: Fix X , Y , A, L, and P ⊆ ∆(X × Y).
(a) The P-game has a Nash equilibrium (pi∗, δ∗), where pi∗ is a distribution over P with
finite support.
(b) If (pi∗, δ∗) is a Nash equilibrium of the P-game such that pi∗ has finite support, then
(i) for every distribution Pr′ ∈ P in the support of pi∗, we have
EPr′[Lδ∗ ] = maxPr∈PEPr[Lδ∗ ];
(ii) if Pr∗ = ∑Pr∈P,pi∗(Pr)>0 pi∗(Pr) Pr (i.e., Pr∗ is the convex combination of the distri-
butions in the support of pi∗, weighted by their probability according to pi∗), then
EPr∗ [Lδ∗ ]
= minδ∈D(X ,A)EPr∗ [Lδ]
= maxPr∈P minδ∈D(X ,A)EPr[Lδ]
= minδ∈D(X ,A)maxPr∈PEPr[Lδ]
= maxPr∈PEPr[Lδ∗ ].
Once nature has chosen a value for X in the P-X-game, we can regard steps 2–5 of the
P-X-game as a game between the bookie and the agent, where the bookie’s strategy is char-
acterized by a distribution in P | X = x and the agent’s is characterized by a distribution over
actions. We call this the P-x-game.
Theorem 3.2: Fix X , Y , A, L, P ⊆ ∆(X × Y).
(a) The P-x-game has a Nash equilibrium (pi∗, δ∗(x)), where pi∗ is a distribution over P |
X = x with finite support.
(b) If (pi∗, δ∗(x)) is a Nash equilibrium of the P-x-game such that pi∗ has finite support, then
(i) for all Pr′ in the support of pi∗, we have
EPr′ [Lδ∗ ] = maxPr∈P|X=xEPr[Lδ∗ ];
(ii) if Pr∗ = ∑Pr∈P,pi∗(Pr)>0 pi∗(Pr) Pr, then
EPr∗ [Lδ∗ ]
= minδ∈D(X ,A)EPr∗ [Lδ]
= maxPr∈P|X=xminδ∈D(X ,A)EPr[Lδ]
= minδ∈D(X ,A)maxPr∈P|X=xEPr[Lδ]
= maxPr∈P|X=xEPr[Lδ∗ ].
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Since all distributions Pr in the expression minδ∈D(X ,A)maxPr∈P|X=xEPr[Lδ] in part (b)(ii) are
in P | X = x, as in (2), the minimum is effectively over randomized actions rather than
decision rules.
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 can be viewed as saying that there is no time inconsistency; rather,
we must just be careful about what game is being played. If the P-game is being played, the
right strategy is the a priori minimax-optimal strategy, both before and after the value of X
is observed; similarly, if the P-X-game is being played, the right strategy is the a posteriori
minimax-optimal strategy, both before and after the value of X is observed. Indeed, thinking
in terms of the games explains the apparent time inconsistency. While it is true that the agent
gains more information by observing X = x, in the P-X game, so does the bookie. This
information may be of more use to the bookie than the agent, so, in this game, the agent can be
worse off by being given the opportunity to learn the value of X .
Of course, in most practical situations, agents (robots, statisticians,. . . ) are not really con-
fronted with a bookie who tries to make them suffer. Rather, the agents may have no idea at all
what distribution holds, except that it is in some set P . Because they have no idea at all, they
decide to prepare themselves for the worst-case and play the minimax strategy. The fact that
such a minimax strategy can be interpreted in terms of a Nash equilibrium of a game helps to
understand differences between different forms of minimax (such as a priori and a posteriori
minimax). From this point of view, it seems strange to have a bookie choose between different
distributions in P according to some distribution pi∗. However, if P is convex, we can replace
the distribution pi∗ on P by a single distribution in P , which consists of the convex combina-
tion of the distributions in the support of pi∗; this is just the distribution Pr∗ of Theorems 3.1
and 3.2. Thus, Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 hold with the bookie restricted to a deterministic strategy.
4 Characterizing A Priori Minimax-Optimal Decision Rules
To get the a posteriori minimax-optimal decision rule we do the obvious thing: if x is observed,
we simply condition each probability distribution Pr ∈ P on X = x, and choose the action
that gives the least expected loss (in the worst case) with respect to P | X = x.
We might expect that the a priori minimax-optimal decision rule should do the same thing.
That is, it should be the decision rule that says, if x is observed, then we choose the action that
again gives the best result (in the worst case) with respect to P | X = x. However, as shown
in GH, this intuition is incorrect in general. There are times, for example, that the best thing to
do is to ignore the observed value of X , and just choose the action that gives the least expected
loss (in the worst case) with respect to P , no matter what value X has. In this section we first
give a sufficient condition for conditioning to be optimal, and then characterize when ignoring
the observed value is optimal.
Definition 4.1: Let 〈P〉 = {Pr ∈ ∆(X × Y) : PrX ∈ PX and (Pr | X = x) ∈ (P | X = x)
for all x ∈ X such that P | X = x is nonempty}.
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Thus, 〈P〉 consists of all distributions Pr whose marginal on X is the marginal on X of some
distribution in P and whose conditional on observing X = x is the conditional of some distri-
bution in P , for all x ∈ X . Clearly P ⊆ 〈P〉, but the converse is not necessarily true. When it
is true, conditioning is optimal.
Proposition 4.2: If P = 〈P〉, then there exists an a priori minimax-optimal rule that is also a
posteriori minimax optimal. If, for all Pr ∈ P and all x ∈ X , Pr(X = x) > 0, then every a
priori minimax-optimal rule is also a posteriori minimax optimal.
As we saw in Example 2.1, the minimax-optimal a priori decision rule is not always the same as
the minimax-optimal a posteriori decision rule. In fact, the minimax-optimal a priori decision
rule ignores the information observed. Formally, a rule δ ignores information if δ(x) = δ(x′)
for all x, x′ ∈ X . If δ ignores information, define L′δ to be the random variable on Y such that
L′δ(y) = Lδ(x, y) for some choice of x. This is well defined, since Lδ(x, y) = Lδ(x′, y) for all
x, x′ ∈ X .
Theorem 4.3: Fix X , Y , L, A, and P ⊆ ∆(X × Y). If, for all PrY ∈ PY , P contains a
distribution Pr′ such that X and Y are independent under Pr′, and Pr′Y = PrY , then there is
an a priori minimax-optimal decision rule that ignores information. Under these conditions,
if δ is an a priori minimax-optimal decision rule that ignores information, then δ essentially
optimizes with respect to the marginal on Y ; that is, maxPr∈P EPr[Lδ] = maxPrY∈PY EPrY [L′δ].
GH focused on the case that PY is a singleton (i.e., the marginal probability on Y is the same
for all distributions in P) and for all x, PY ⊆ (P | X = x)Y . It is immediate from Theorem 4.3
that ignoring information is a priori minimax optimal in this case.
5 C-conditioning and Calibration
Conditioning is the most common way of updating uncertainty. In this section, we examine
updating by conditioning. The following definition makes precise the idea that a decision rule
is based on conditioning.
Definition 5.1: A probability update rule is a function Π : 2∆(X×Y)×X → 2∆(X×Y) mapping a
setP of distributions and an observation x to a set Π(P, x) of distributions; intuitively,Π(P, x)
is the result of updating P with the observation x.
Definition 5.2: Let C = {X1, . . . ,Xk} be a partition of X ; that is, Xi 6= ∅ for i = 1, . . . , k;
X1 ∪ . . .Xk = X ; and Xi ∩ Xj = ∅ for i 6= j. If x ∈ X , let C(x) be the cell containing x;
i.e., the unique element Xi ∈ C such that x ∈ Xi. The C-conditioning probability update rule
is the function Π defined by taking Π(P, x) = P | X ∈ C(x). A decision rule δ is based on
C-conditioning if it amounts to first updating the set P to P | X ∈ C(x), and then taking the
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minimax-optimal distribution over actions relative to P | X ∈ C(x). Formally, δ is based on
C-conditioning if, for all x ∈ X with Pr(X = x) > 0 for some Pr ∈ P ,
max
Pr∈P|X∈C(x)
EPr[Lδ] = min
δ∈D(X ,A)
max
Pr∈P|X∈C(x)
EPr[Lδ].
All examples of a priori minimax decision rules that we have seen so far are based on C-
conditioning: Standard conditioning is based on C-conditioning, where we take C to consist
of all singletons; ignoring information is also based on C-conditioning, where C = {X}. This
suggests that, perhaps, the a priori minimax decision rule must also be based on C-conditioning.
The following well-known example shows that this conjecture is false.
Example 5.3: [The Monty Hall Problem] [Mosteller 1965; vos Savant 1990]: Suppose that
you’re on a game show and given a choice of three doors. Behind one is a car; behind the
others are goats. You pick door 1. Before opening door 1, Monty Hall, the host (who knows
what is behind each door) opens one of the other two doors, say, door 3, which has a goat. He
then asks you if you still want to take what’s behind door 1, or to take what’s behind door 2
instead. Should you switch? You may assume that initially, the car was equally likely to be
behind each of the doors.
We formalize this well-known problem as a P-game, as follows: Y = {1, 2, 3} represents
the door which the car is behind. X = {G2, G3}, where, for j ∈ {2, 3}, Gj corresponds to
the quizmaster showing that there is a goat behind door j. A = {1, 2, 3}, where action a ∈ A
corresponds to the door you finally choose, after Monty has opened door 2 or 3. The loss
function is once again the classification loss, L(i, j) = 1 if i 6= j, that is, if you choose a door
with a goat behind it, and L(i, j) = 0 if i = j, that is, if you choose a door with a car. P is the
set of all distributions Pr on X × Y satisfying
PrY(Y = 1) = PrY(Y = 2) = PrY(Y = 3) =
1
3
Pr(Y = 2 | X = G2) = 0
Pr(Y = 3 | X = G3) = 0.
It is well known, and easy to show, that the minimax-optimal strategy is always to switch doors,
no matter whether Monty opens door 2 or door 3. Since the game is an instance of the P-game,
this means that the decision rule δ∗ given by
δ∗(G2) = 3 ; δ
∗(G3) = 2
is an a priori minimax rule. It is clear that δ∗ is not based on C-conditioning: there exist only
two partitions of X . The corresponding two update rules based on C-conditioning amount to,
respectively, (a) ignoring X and choosing each door with probability 1/3, or (b) conditioning
on X in the standard way and thus choosing each of the two remaining doors with probability
1/2. Neither strategy (a) nor (b) is minimax optimal. Thus, the a priori minimax decision rule
in the P-game is not always based on C-conditioning.
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While the example shows that C-conditioning is not always optimal in the minimax sense,
it can be justified by other means; as we now show, C-conditioning is closely related to cali-
bration. Indeed, a probability update rule is calibrated if and only if for each P , it amounts to
C-conditioning for some partition C of X . Calibration is usually defined in terms of empirical
data. To explain what it means, consider a weather forecaster, who predicts the probability
of rain every day. How should we interpret the probabilities that she announces? The usual
interpretation—which coincides with most people’s intuitive understanding—is that, in the
long run, on those days at which the weather forecaster predict probability p, it will rain ap-
proximately 100p% of the time [Dawid 1982]. Thus, for example, among all days for which
she predicted 0.1, the fraction of days with rain was close to 0.1 (given the weather forecaster’s
precision, we should require it to be between, say, 0.05 and 0.15). A weather forecaster with
this property is said to be calibrated. If a weather forecaster is calibrated, and you make bets
which, based on her probabilistic predictions, seem favorable, then in the long run you cannot
lose money. If a weather forecaster is not calibrated, there exist bets which seem favorable but
which result in a loss. Note that calibration is a minimal requirement: a weather forecaster who
predicts 0.3 for every single day of the year may be calibrated if it indeed rains on 30% of the
days, but still not very informative. Thus, given two calibrated forecasters, we prefer the one
that makes “sharper” predictions, in a sense to be defined below.
In our case, we do not test probabilistic predictions with respect to empirical relative fre-
quencies, but with respect to other sets of “potentially underlying” probability measures. We
are not the first to do this; see, for example, [Vovk, Gammerman, and Shafer 2005]. The defi-
nition of calibration extends naturally to this situation. To see how, we first define calibration
with respect to a single underlying probability measure. Let P = {Pr} for a single distribution
Pr and let Π be a probability update rule (Definition 5.1) such that Π({Pr}, x) contains just a
single distribution for each x ∈ X (for example, Π could be ordinary conditioning). We define
R = {R : R = ( Π(P, x) )Y for some x ∈ X}. (3)
R is just the range of Π, restricted to distributions of Y , the random variable that we are
interested in predicting; its elements are the distributions on Y that Pr is mapped to, upon
observing different values of x. Note that R is defined relative to a probability update rule Π
and a set P of distributions. By our assumptions on P and Π, R = {{R1}, {R2}, . . .} is a set
of singleton sets, each containing one distribution on Y . For {R} ∈ R, let XR be the set of
x ∈ X that map Pr to R, i.e.
XR = {x ∈ X : ( Π({Pr}, x) )Y = {R}}.
Note that the sets {XR} partition X . Π is calibrated relative to P if for all R with {R} ∈ R,
(Pr | X ∈ XR)Y = R.
Thus, conditioned on the event that the agent predicts Y using distribution R, the distribution
of Y must indeed be equal to R.
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It is straightforward to generalize this notion to sets P of probability distributions that are
not singletons, and update rules Π that map to sets of probabilities. Definition (3) remains
unchanged. For R ∈ R, we now take XR to be the set of x ∈ X that map P to R, that is,
XR = {x ∈ X : ( Π(P, x) )Y = R}. (4)
Once again, the sets {XR} partition X .
Definition 5.4: Π is calibrated relative to P if for all Pr ∈ P and R ∈ R,
PrY (· | X ∈ XR) ∈ R.
Π is calibrated if it is calibrated relative to all sets of distributions P ⊆ ∆(X × Y).
Proposition 5.5: For all partitions C of X and all P , C-conditioning is calibrated relative to
P .
Calibration as defined here is a very weak notion. For example, the update rule Π(P, x) =
∆(X × Y) that maps each combination of x and P to the set of all distributions on X × Y
is calibrated under our definition. This update rule loses whatever information may have been
contained in P , and is therefore not very useful. Intuitively, the fewer distributions that there
are in P , the more information P contains. Thus, we restrict ourselves to sets P that are as
small as possible, while still being calibrated.
Definition 5.6: Update rule Π′ is wider than update rule Π relative to P if, for all x ∈ X ,
Π(P, x) ⊆ Π′(P, x).
Π′ is strictly wider relative to P if the inclusion is strict for some some x. Π is (strictly)
narrower than Π′, relative to P if Π′ is (strictly) wider than Π relative to P . Π is sharply
calibrated relative to P if Π is calibrated relative to P and there is no update rule Π′ that is
calibrated and strictly narrower than Π relative to P . Π is sharply calibrated if Π is sharply
calibrated relative to all P ⊆ ∆(X × Y).
We now want to prove that every sharply calibrated update rule must involve conditioning.
To make this precise, we need the following definition.
Definition 5.7: Π is a generalized conditioning update rule if, for all P ⊆ ∆(X × Y), there
exists a partition C (that may depend on P) such that for all x ∈ X , Π(P, x) = P | C(x).
Note that in a generalized conditioning rule, we condition on a partition of X , but the partition
may depend on the setP . For example, for someP , the rule may ignore the value of x, whereas
for other P , it may amount to ordinary conditioning. It easily follows from Proposition 4.2 that
every generalized conditioning rule is calibrated. The next result shows that every sharply
calibrated update rule must be a generalized conditioning rule.
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Theorem 5.8: There exists an update rule that is sharply calibrated. Moreover, every sharply
calibrated update rule is a generalized conditioning update rule.
Theorem 5.8 says that an agent who wants to be sharply calibrated should update her prob-
abilities using conditioning (although what she conditions on may depend on the set of proba-
bilities that she considers possible).
Given the game-theoretic interpretation of Section 3, we might wonder if there is a variant
of the games considered earlier for which the equilibrium involves generalized conditioning.
As we show in the full paper, there is (although the game is perhaps not as natural as the ones
considered in Section 3). Roughly speaking, we consider a three-player game, with a bookie
and two agents. The bookie again chooses a probability distribution from a set P; the bookie
also chooses the loss function from some set. The first agent observes P and x and updates P
to Px. The second agent learns Px and b (but not P and x) and makes the minimax-optimal
decision. As we show, in Nash equilibrium, the first agent’s updated set of probabilities, Px,
must be the result of C-conditioning, where, as in Theorem 5.8, C may depend on P .
6 Discussion
We have examined how to update uncertainty represented by a set of probability distributions,
where we motivate updating rules in terms of the minimax criterion. Our key innovation has
been to show how different approaches can be understood in terms of a game between a bookie
and an agent, where the bookie picks a distribution from the set and the agent chooses an action
after making an observation. Different approaches to updating arise depending on whether the
bookie’s choice is made before or after the observation. We believe that this game-theoretic ap-
proach should prove useful more generally in understanding different approaches to updating.
We hope to explore this further in future work.
We end this paper by giving an overview of the senses in which conditioning is optimal and
the senses in which it is not, when uncertainty is represented by a set of distributions. We have
established that conditioning the full set P on X = x is minimax optimal in the P-x-game, but
not in the P-game. The minimax-optimal decision rule in the P-game is often an instance of
C-conditioning, a generalization of conditioning. The Monty Hall problem showed, however,
that this is not always the case. On the other hand, if instead of the minimax criterion, we insist
that update rules are calibrated, then C-conditioning is always the right thing to do after all.
There are two more senses in which conditioning is the right thing to do. First, Walley
[1991] shows that, in a sense, conditioning is the only updating rule that is coherent, according
to his notion of coherence. He justifies coherence decision theoretically, but not by using the
minimax criterion. Note that the minimax criterion puts a total order on decision rules. That
is, we can say that δ is at least as good as δ′ if
maxPr∈PEPr[Lδ] ≤ maxPr∈PEPr[Lδ′ ].
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By way of contrast, Walley [1991] puts a partial order on decision rules by taking δ to be at
least as good as δ′ if
maxPr∈PEPr[Lδ − Lδ′ ] ≤ 0.
Since both maxPr∈PEPr[Lδ − Lδ′ ] and maxPr∈PEPr[Lδ′ − Lδ] may be positive, this is indeed
a partial order. If we use this ordering to determine the optimal decision rule then, as Walley
shows, conditioning is the only right thing to do.
Second, in this paper, we interpreted “conditioning” as conditioning the full given set of
distributions P . Then conditioning is not always an a priori minimax optimal strategy on the
observation X = x. Alternatively, we could first somehow select a single Pr ∈ P , condition
Pr on the observed X = x, and then take the optimal action relative to Pr | X = x. It follows
from Theorem 3.1 that the minimax-optimal decision rule δ∗ in a P-game can be understood
this way. It defines the optimal response to the distribution Pr∗ ∈ ∆(X × Y) defined in
Theorem 3.1(b)(ii). If P is convex, then Pr∗ ∈ P . In this sense, the minimax-optimal decision
rule can always be viewed as an instance of “conditioning,” but on a single special Pr∗ that
depends on the loss function L rather than on the full set P .
It is worth noting that Grove and Halpern [1998] give an axiomatic characterization of
conditioning sets of probabilities, based on axioms given by van Fraassen [1987, 1985] that
characterizing conditioning in the case that uncertainty is characterized by a single probability
measure. As Grove and Halpern point out, their axioms are not as compelling as those of van
Fraassen. It would be interesting to know whether an axiomatization that is similar in spirit
can be used to characterize the update notions that we have considered here.
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A Proofs
To prove Theorems 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, we need two preliminary observations. The first
is a characterization of Nash equilibria. In the P-game, a Nash equilibrium or saddle point
amounts to a pair (pi∗, δ∗) where pi∗ is a distribution on P and δ∗ is a randomized decision rule
such that
Epi∗EPr[Lδ∗ ]
= minδ∈D(X ,A)Epi∗EPr[Lδ]
= maxPr∈PEPr[Lδ∗ ],
(5)
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where Epi∗EPr is an abbreviation of
∑
Pr∈P,pi∗(Pr)>0 pi
∗(Pr) Pr. In the P-x-game, a Nash equi-
librium is a pair (pi∗, δ∗) where pi∗ is a distribution on P | X = x and δ∗ is a randomized
decision rule, such that (5) holds with P replaced by P | X = x.
The second observation we need is the following special case of Theorem 3.2 in [Gru¨nwald and Dawid 2004],
itself an extension of Von Neumann’s original minimax theorem.
Theorem A.1: If Y ′ is a finite set, P ′ is a closed and convex subset of ∆(Y ′), A′ a closed and
convex subset of IRk for some k ∈ IN , and L′ : Y ′ ×A′ → IR is a bounded function such that,
for each y ∈ Y ′, L(y, a) is a continuous function of a, then there exists some Pr∗ ∈ P ′ and
some ρ∗ ∈ A′ such that,
EPr∗ [L
′(Y ′, ρ∗)]
= minρ∈A′EPr∗ [L
′(Y ′, ρ)]
= maxPr∈P ′EPr[L
′(Y ′, ρ∗)].
(6)
With these observations, we are ready to prove Theorem 3.1:
Theorem 3.1: Fix X , Y , A, L, and P ⊆ ∆(X × Y).
(a) The P-game has a Nash equilibrium (pi∗, δ∗), where pi∗ is a distribution over P with
finite support.
(b) If (pi∗, δ∗) is a Nash equilibrium of the P-game such that pi∗ has finite support, then
(i) for every distribution Pr′ ∈ P in the support of pi∗, we have
EPr′[Lδ∗ ] = maxPr∈PEPr[Lδ∗ ];
(ii) if Pr∗ = ∑Pr∈P,pi∗(Pr)>0 pi∗(Pr) Pr (i.e., Pr∗ is the convex combination of the distri-
butions in the support of pi∗, weighted by their probability according to pi∗), then
EPr∗ [Lδ∗ ]
= minδ∈D(X ,A)EPr∗ [Lδ]
= maxPr∈P minδ∈D(X ,A)EPr[Lδ]
= minδ∈D(X ,A)maxPr∈PEPr[Lδ]
= maxPr∈PEPr[Lδ∗ ].
Proof: To prove part (a), we introduce a new loss function L′ that is essentially equivalent to
L, but is designed so that Theorem A.1 can be applied. Let Y ′ = X × Y , let A′ = D(X ,A),
and define the function L′ : Y ′ ×A′ → IR as
L′((x, y), δ) := Lδ(x, y) =
∑
a∈A
δ(x)(a)L(y, a).
Obviously L′ is equivalent to L in the sense that for all Pr ∈ ∆(X × Y), for all δ ∈ D(X ,A),
EPr[Lδ] = EPr[L
′((X, Y ), δ)].
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If we view A′ = D(X ,A) as a convex subset of IR|X |·(|A|−1), then L′((x, y), a) becomes a
continuous function of a ∈ A′. Let P ′ be the convex closure of P . Since X × Y is finite, P ′
consists of all distributions Pr∗ on (X ,Y) of the form c1 Pr1+ · · ·+ ck Prk for k = |X × Y|,
wherePr1, . . . ,Prk ∈ P and c1, . . . , ck are nonnegative real coefficients such that c1+· · ·+ck =
1. Applying Theorem A.1 to L′ and P ′, it follows that (6) holds for some Pr∗ ∈ P ′ and some
δ∗ ∈ A′ = D(X ,A) (that is, the ρ∗ in (6) is δ∗). Thus, there must be some distribution pi∗
on P with finite support such that Pr∗ = ∑Pr∈P,pi∗(Pr)>0 pi∗(Pr) Pr. It is easy to see that the
two equalities in (6) are literally the two equalities in (5). Thus, (pi∗, δ∗) is a Nash equilibrium.
This proves part (a).
To prove part (b)(i), suppose first that (pi∗, δ∗) is a Nash equilibrium of the P-game such
that pi∗ has finite support. Let V = maxPr∈P EPr[Lδ∗ ]. By (5), we have that∑
Pr∈P,pi∗(Pr)>0
pi∗(Pr)EPr[Lδ∗ ] = V. (7)
Trivially, for each Pr′ ∈ P , we must have EPr′ [Lδ∗ ] ≤ maxPr∈P EPr[Lδ∗ ]. If this inequality
were strict for some Pr′ ∈ P in the support of pi∗, then ∑Pr∈P,pi∗(Pr)>0 pi∗(Pr)EPr[Lδ∗ ] < V ,
contradicting (7). This proves part (b)(i).
To prove part (b)(ii), note that straightforward arguments show that
maxPr∈P EPr[Lδ∗ ]
≥ minδ∈D(X ,A)maxPr∈P EPr[Lδ]
≥ maxPr∈P minδ∈D(X ,A)EPr[Lδ]
≥ minδ∈D(X ,A)EPr∗ [Lδ].
(The second inequality follows because, for all Pr′ ∈ P , minδ∈D(X ,A)maxPr∈P EPr[Lδ] ≥
minδ∈D(X ,A)EPr′[Lδ].) Since (pi∗, δ∗) is a Nash equilibrium, part (b)(ii) is immediate, using the
equalities in (5).
Theorem 3.2: Fix X , Y , A, L, P ⊆ ∆(X × Y).
(a) The P-x-game has a Nash equilibrium (pi∗, δ∗(x)), where pi∗ is a distribution over P |
X = x with finite support.
(b) If (pi∗, δ∗(x)) is a Nash equilibrium of the P-x-game such that pi∗ has finite support, then
(i) for all Pr′ in the support of pi∗, we have
EPr′ [Lδ∗ ] = maxPr∈P|X=xEPr[Lδ∗ ];
(ii) if Pr∗ = ∑Pr∈P,pi∗(Pr)>0 pi∗(Pr) Pr, then
EPr∗ [Lδ∗ ]
= minδ∈D(X ,A)EPr∗ [Lδ]
= maxPr∈P|X=xminδ∈D(X ,A)EPr[Lδ]
= minδ∈D(X ,A)maxPr∈P|X=xEPr[Lδ]
= maxPr∈P|X=xEPr[Lδ∗ ].
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Proof: To prove part (a), we apply Theorem A.1, setting L′ = L, Y ′ = Y , A′ = ∆(A), and
P ′ to the convex closure of P | X = x. Thus, (6) holds for some ρ∗ ∈ A′, which we denote
δ∗(x). As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, there must be some distribution pi∗ on P | X = x with
finite support such that Pr∗ = ∑Pr∈P|X=x,pi∗(Pr)>0 pi∗(Pr) Pr. The remainder of the argument
is identical to that in Theorem 3.1.
The proof of part (b) is completely analogous to the proof of part (b) of Theorem 3.1, and
is thus omitted.
Proposition 4.2: If P = 〈P〉, then there exists an a priori minimax-optimal rule that is also a
posteriori minimax optimal. If, for all Pr ∈ P and all x ∈ X , Pr(X = x) > 0, then every a
priori minimax-optimal rule is also a posteriori minimax optimal.
Proof: Let X+ = {x ∈ X : maxPr∈P Pr(X = x) > 0}. Let mδ be a random variable on X
defined by taking mδ(x) = 0 if x /∈ X+, and mδ(x) = maxPr′∈P|X=xEPr′ [Lδ] if x ∈ X+. We
first show that for every δ ∈ D(X ,A),
max
Pr∈P
EPr[Lδ] = max
Pr∈P
∑
x∈X
PrX (X = x)mδ(x). (8)
Note that
EPr[Lδ]
=
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y Pr((X, Y ) = (x, y))Lδ(x, y)
=
∑
{x∈X :PrX (x)>0} PrX (X = x)
∑
y∈Y Pr(Y = x | X = x)Lδ(x, y)
=
∑
{x∈X :PrX (x)>0} PrX (X = x)EPr|X=x[Lδ]
≤
∑
{x∈X :PrX (x)>0} PrX (X = x)maxPr′∈P|X=xEPr′[Lδ]
=
∑
{x∈X :PrX (x)>0} PrX (X = x)mδ(x)
=
∑
x∈X PrX (X = x)mδ(x).
Taking the max over all Pr ∈ P , we get that
max
Pr∈P
EPr[Lδ] ≤ max
Pr∈P
∑
x∈X
PrX (X = x)mδ(x).
It remains to show the reverse inequality in (8). Since P is closed, there exists Pr∗ ∈ P
such that
max
Pr∈P
∑
x∈X
PrX (X = x)mδ(x) =
∑
x∈X
Pr∗X (X = x)mδ(x).
Moreover, since P | X = x is closed, if x ∈ X+, there exists Prx ∈ P | X = x such that
mδ(x) = EPrx [Lδ]. Define Pr† ∈ ∆(X × Y) by taking
Pr†((X, Y ) = (x, y)) =
{
0 if x /∈ X+
Pr∗X (X = x) Pr
x(Y = y) if x ∈ X+.
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Clearly Pr†X = Pr∗X and (Pr† | X = x) = (Prx | X = x) ∈ P | X = x if x ∈ X+. Thus, by
definition, Pr† ∈ 〈P〉. Since, by assumption, 〈P〉 = P , it follows that Pr† ∈ P . In addition, it
easily follows that
maxPr∈P
∑
x∈X PrX (X = x)mδ(x)
=
∑
x∈X Pr
†
X (X = x)mδ(x)
=
∑
x∈X+ Pr
†
X (X = x)
∑
y∈Y Pr
†(Y = y | X = x)Lδ(x, y)
= EPr† [Lδ]
≤ maxPr∈P EPr[Lδ].
This establishes (8).
Now let δ∗ be an a priori minimax decision rule. Since the P-game has a Nash equilibrium
(Theorem 3.1), such a δ∗ must exist. Let X ′ be the set of all x′ ∈ X for which δ∗ is not
minimax optimal in the P–x′-game, i.e., x′ ∈ X ′ iff x ∈ X+ and maxPr′∈P|X=x′ EPr′ [Lδ∗ ] >
minδ∈D(X ,A)maxPr′∈P|X=x′ EPr′ [Lδ]. Define δ′ to be a decision rule that agrees with δ∗ on
X \ X ′ and is minimax optimal in the P | X = x′ game for all x′ ∈ X ′; that is, δ′(x) = δ(x)
for x /∈ X ′ and, for x ∈ X ′,
δ(x) ∈ argminδ∈D(X ,A) max
Pr′∈P|X=x′
EPr′[Lδ].
By construction, mδ′(x) ≤ mδ∗(x) for all x ∈ X and mδ′(x) < mδ∗(x) for all x ∈ X ′. Thus,
using (8), we have
maxPr∈P EPr[Lδ′ ]
= maxPr∈P
∑
x∈X Pr(X = x)mδ′(x)
≤ maxPr∈P
∑
x∈X Pr(X = x)mδ∗(x)
= maxPr∈P EPr[Lδ∗ ].
(9)
Thus, δ′ is also an a priori minimax decision rule. But, by construction, δ′ is also an a posteriori
minimax decision rule, and it follows that there exists at least one decision rule (namely, δ′) that
is both a priori and a posteriori minimax optimal. Moreover, if Pr(X = x) > 0 for all Pr ∈ P
and x ∈ X and X ′ 6= ∅, then the inequality in (9) is strict. It follows that X ′ is empty in this
case, for otherwise δ∗ would not be a priori minimax optimal, contradicting our assumptions.
But, if X ′ is empty, then δ∗ must also be a posteriori minimax optimal.
Theorem 4.3: Fix X , Y , L, A, and P ⊆ ∆(X × Y). If, for all PrY ∈ PY , P contains a
distribution Pr′ such that X and Y are independent under Pr′, and Pr′Y = PrY , then there is
an a priori minimax-optimal decision rule that ignores information. Under these conditions,
if δ is an a priori minimax-optimal decision rule that ignores information, then δ essentially
optimizes with respect to the marginal on Y ; that is, maxPr∈P EPr[Lδ] = maxPrY∈PY EPrY [L′δ].
Proof: Let P ′ be the subset of P of distributions under which X and Y are independent. Let
D(X ,A)′ be the subset of D(X ,A) of rules that ignore information. Let δ∗ ∈ D(X ,A)′ be
defined as the optimal decision rule that ignores information relative to P ′, i.e.
max
Pr∈P ′
EPr[Lδ∗ ] = min
δ∈D(X ,A)′
max
Pr∈P ′
EPr[Lδ].
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We have
maxPr∈P EPr[Lδ∗ ]
≥ minδ∈D(X ,A)maxPr∈P EPr[Lδ]
≥ minδ∈D(X ,A)maxPr∈P ′ EPr[Lδ]
= minδ∈D(X ,A)′ maxPr∈P ′ EPr[Lδ] [see below]
= maxPr∈P ′ EPr[Lδ∗ ].
(10)
To see that the equality between the third and fourth line in (10) holds, note that for Pr ∈ P ′,
we have
EPr[Lδ]
=
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y Pr(x, y)Lδ(x, y)
=
∑
x∈X Pr(X = x)
∑
y∈Y Pr(Y = y)(
∑
a∈A δ(x)(a)L(y, a))
The decision rule that minimizes this expression is independent of x; it is the distribution δ∗
over actions that minimizes
∑
y∈Y
Pr(Y = y)(
∑
a∈A
δ∗(a)L(y, a)).
This calculation also shows that, since δ∗ ignores information, for Pr ∈ P ′, we have that
max
Pr∈P
EPr[Lδ∗ ] = max
PrY∈PY
EPrY [L
′
δ∗ ] = max
Pr∈P ′
EPr[Lδ∗ ]. (11)
This implies that the first and last line of (10) are equal to each other, and therefore also equal
to the second line of (10). It follows that δ∗ is a priori minimax optimal. Since every a priori
minimax optimal rule that ignores information must satisfy (11), the second result follows.
Proposition 5.5: For all partitions C of X and all P , C-conditioning is calibrated relative to
P .
Proof: Let C = {X1, . . . ,Xk} be a partition consisting of k ≥ 1 elements. Let Rj = (P |
X ∈ Xj)Y and let XRj = Xj , for j = 1, . . . , k; let R = {R1, . . . ,Rk}. Plugging this into
Definition 5.4, we find that for C-conditioning to be calibrated, we must have that Pr(· | X ∈
Xj) ∈ P | X ∈ Xj for all P ⊆ ∆(X × Y), all Pr ∈ P , and all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. But this is true
by definition of P | X ∈ Xj .
We next want to prove Theorem 5.8. We need a preliminary lemma that shows that, in a
sense, conditioning on some sets is always at least as good as any other update rule.
Lemma A.2: For every probability update rule Π and closed set P ⊆ ∆(X × Y), if Π
is calibrated relative to P , then there exists a partition C of X such that C-conditioning is
narrower than Π relative to P .
Proof: Suppose that Π is calibrated relative to P . Suppose that R = {R1, . . . ,Rk} (where
R is as defined in (3)). Let C := {XR1 , . . . ,XRk}. Then C is a partition of X . We want to
show that C-conditioning is narrower than Π relative to P . Thus, we need to show that for
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all x ∈ XRj , P | X ∈ XRj ⊆ Π(P, x). By assumption, Π(P, x) = Rj . The result is now
immediate from the definition of calibration.
Theorem 5.8: There exists an update rule that is sharply calibrated. Moreover, every sharply
calibrated update rule is a generalized conditioning update rule.
Proof: To show that there exists an update rule that is sharply calibrated, we actually construct
a generalized conditioning rule that is sharply calibrated. It suffices to show that for each closed
P ⊆ ∆(X × Y), there exists some partition C such that C-conditioning is sharply calibrated
relative to P . We can place a partial order ≤P on partitions C by taking C1 ≤P C2 if C1-
conditioning is narrower than C2 conditioning relative to P . Since X is finite, there are only
finitely many possible partitions of of X . Thus, there must be some minimal elements of P .
We claim that each minimal element of≤P is sharply calibrated relative to P . For suppose that
C is minimal relative to ≤P . If Π is an update rule that is strictly narrower than C relative to P ,
then, by Lemma A.2, there exists a partition C′ such that C′ is narrower than Π relative to P .
But then C′ <P C, contradicting the minimality of C. This proves the desired result.
To show that every sharply calibrated update rule is a generalized conditioning rule, sup-
pose that Π is sharply calibrated. Given P , by Lemma A.2, there must be some partition C
such that C-conditioning is narrower that Π, relative to P . By Proposition 5.5, C-conditioning
is calibrated relative to P . Since Π is sharply calibrated, there can be no Π′ that is strictly
narrower than Π relative to P and that is also calibrated relative to P . Thus, Π must in fact
coincide with C-conditioning relative to P . This proves that Π is a generalized conditioning
rule.
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